I will start with the points of agreement with Tomas’ text – they are quite numerous– while including in this commentary the reasons for my final disagreement on what one might expect from anarchism, its scope and therefore its importance in the future.
Anarchism today
The first point of agreement is the most immediate. It deals with Tomas’ section entitled “anarchism today”. That section expresses very well, better than I would do it here, what I have sensed for quite a long time: namely an increasingly deeper divorce (which does not date from today) between an official anarchism on the one hand, – anarchist organizations, anarchist ideology, anarchist identity,– and, on the other, those movements without any precise label, that more radical fringe whom the public powers (who occasionally happen not to be mistaken) sometimes designate by the fair term of “anarcho-autonomist” .
The libertarian renewal that occurred during last century’s end has enabled the crystallization – but also the sedimentation,– of a noticeable number of activists who reclaim an anarchist identity. This often ageing category of activists has enlivened the traditional organizations (mainly through the CNT, Alternative libertaire, Organisation Communiste Libertaire, the Anarchist Federation and its various dissidents), but not necessarily the libertarian logic and dynamic. And thus while there exist efficient anti-authoritarian movements, often with quite rich and complex components, practices and world visions, there is side by side an anarchism which is partly ossified, established (as Tomas emphasizes) which, at best, duplicates the surviving leftist organizations, and whose sole consistent practice (apart from running the organization) is often limited to a very traditional participation in a bureaucratized trade-union movement, without any authentic emancipating inspiration, confined in an approach that tends to reduce the libertarian project to a simple rhetoric, built on stock answers with no other reality than the words and symbols of a past which has been translated into more or less sentimental and hollow references [1].
The severity of my judgment does not stem from a far-off viewpoint. It is based on my participation in the different movements of recent years; movements in which the anarcho-autonomists and the “non[-]specifically organized” as they used to say at La Gryffe bookstore, have played an important part. La Gryffe happens to maintain relations with the “anarcho-autonomists” of the city of Lyons, a city where this current is very active, particularly through the squatter movement [2]. It also happens that I am a member of the local CNT-Education (Saint-Etienne), which may be (unfortunately) atypical since, in the setting of the university, it has always worked closely with the so-called “autonomist” currents; but, to make it clear, it also rejects the bureaucratized union practices which the anarcho-autonomists (in Saint-Etienne and I hope elsewhere) are absolutely right to denounce. To illustrate the problem brought up by Tomas, – the choice between a hardly anarchistic anarchism which relates to the past like a Canada-Dry to alcohol; and a de facto anarchism of the libertarian project, in which the positions and practices appear – I will tell two stories. One is anecdotal and personal; the other much more crucial in its real consequences.
A personal anecdote
I participated in a meeting of university activists, some time ago, in connection with a CNT-Education convention. One of the points discussed, which I consider as paltry, but quite characteristic of how conventions waste their time (and also lose all libertarian inspiration) was to know whether student branches were entitled or not to call themselves FAU (Fédération anarchiste universitaire) and to sign pamphlets with that logo. As for us, in Saint-Etienne, our pamphlets (whether CNT or not) are flexible and accommodate many identifications, provided they mention what precise collective is the author (most often a group of a particular place, but that could also be an ad hoc group of a particular student body, or even of a particular academic year and field, for instance “the second year female students for a bachelor’s degree in English”). Half of those in attendance (some twenty activists) shared our viewpoint, and the discussion became quite heated quite rapidly, the defenders of an organizational discipline hanging on to their position of authority (decisions taken in conventions often appear as emanating from some sort of religious council) [3]. I suddenly realized how the Spanish CNT could so quickly become bureaucratic in the Fall of 1936 and remodel itself in a few days as a state apparatus, this very state which the Spanish anarchist movement denounced a few days before but which it already bore potentially (as well as many other things).
Seventy years later such a tiny organization as the French CNT produced in turn a comparable bureaucratic behavior. Its dwarfish meetings naively applied that state logic which they pretended to oppose. In contrast with the impotent ideological sectarianism of some, or the integration within a bureaucratized union of the others, the practices and stances of the anarcho-autonomists are appropriate and not only from a libertarian viewpoint. If they are unsuccessful in reaching the brain of the most formalistic anarchism they ought at least move its heart. I am not sure that such is the case.
A collective event
My second story relates to a collective event which is certainly of greater consequence than the decision-making of CNT-Education conventions (I imagine that activists who claim to belong to the CNT have continued to name themselves as they still wish [such is our case in Saint-Etienne]; that contemporary scene has evidently nothing in common with Catalonia in 1937, when the simple fact of reading an anarchist journal which was not authorized with the imprimatur of the Republican state could send you to labor camp [see François Godicheau, La guerre d’Espagne, République et révolution en Catalogne, Odile Jacob, 2004]. This second history concerns the 2003 demonstrations against the G8 organized in Switzerland, in which the libertarians had come in great number as in the preceding occurrences . It is probably then that the chasm between a vibrant anarchism and a petrified anarchism manifested itself most clearly. To use tough words and therefore oversimplify the situation, one may give the following description.
On the one hand there were thousands of participants, not a crowd or a mass of atomized individuals, but a multitude of small groups and networks, familiarized by their practice and previous experience with this type of meeting, who functioned through affinity , confronting their experiences and self-organizing; they let the general assemblies and each current or tendency address and decide by themselves what was suitable to do, how to articulate themselves with other choices (violence or non violence for instance) and how to think of forms of action without any representation or intermediaries. In brief, on the one hand there were activists who called themselves anarchists or non anarchists, who were preparing to act, in practice, by carrying out a libertarian logic, that is to say a federalist logic of action and direct democracy.
On the other hand, there was a cartel of organizations convinced that they incarnated anarchism. It was very determined to master several months ahead the staging of international anarchism, to avoid (in the eyes of certain people) the ill-timed “outbursts” of former years. Killing two birds with one stone, it wanted to take advantage of the presence of a large number of expendable individuals to organize (in the style of May Day demonstrations) a mass parade clearly identified by its banners and the megaphones of its organizers. And it would finally be sufficient to flank it on both sides to reach the a-temporal goal, so to say “in the air” : having one’s photo in the news, if possible in color (so as to distinguish well the black from the red flags) with the banner headline “5000 anarchists march at the G8”.
On the one hand there was the logic of an anarchism in action, in effect (in the sense of direct action and of propaganda by the deed), based on self-organization, federalism and direct democracy. On the other one could see very precisely, from the lessons of the Spanish experience, a governmental anarchism, a statist logic grounded on representation, obedience to watchwords, destruction of any concrete and proximate affinity link in favor of the naked individual, totally available for what organizations expected of him or her, a disciplined individual in a position to repeat the expected slogans planned ahead of time, to go where he would be told to go and behave decently as the representative of a cartel of organizations had decided for him or for her. The cartel therefore placed a security crew (this embryo of a police force) to oversee the execution of the (sometimes misunderstood) decisions and instructions of the indirect democracy of conventions and preliminary programs [4].
I will not expand on this, because the second item of Tomas’ text enables me to look further at the divorce between these efficient libertarian practices and a purely ideological anarchism, grounded on appearance and representation, acting in reverse of what it pretends to draw its authority from.
The Enlightenment, the question of the subject and universalism
I will not repeat what Tomas Ibanez says, except to stress my total agreement. As a political current, anarchism is born in a given place at a given time, – as all things, one should add –, but anarchism is precisely the only political current which considers the absolute singularity of situations, events and therefore of beings (a demonstration against the G8, for instance, in Switzerland, on a sunny Spring day in 2003). The tragedy, as Tomas demonstrates, is that the singularity of the situation and the context in which anarchism is born, - in Europe, in the 19th century– generated the extraordinary idea that it did not believe itself to be “exceptional” (as everybody does and with good reason), but on the contrary, and in an apparently more modest way, it experienced itself (subjectively) as “universal,” thus pretending (humble servants of this heavy duty) to erase or subsume all the other singularities, before, afterwards and elsewhere, submitting them to its general law and its supposed “enlightenment”, before expanding and perceiving these famous lights (the advance of knowledge! Science!) under the particularly obscure and savage shape of colonialism, imperialism, industrial war, mass massacres and totalitarian regimes (red and brown). And this is where one finds again the divorce between a dead anarchism and efficient libertarian practices, but also my first disagreement with Tomas.
What holds an interest in a careful reading of anarchist texts is that one observes how, from Proudhon to Bakunin but particularly among the very numerous activists engaged thereafter in struggles and effective emancipation movements, libertarian thinking has never stopped denouncing the foundations of bourgeois and capitalist modernity: the illusions and lies of law, of representative democracy and “social contract”; the pitfalls of communication; the self-serving lies of proprietary limits (pars extra partes) with the restrictive freedom that goes with them (My freedom ends where someone else’s begins); the illusions and lies of the fragmented individual, “free, reasonable, calculating and utilitarian, responsible of his actions and choices”; in brief the damaging results of the fiction of the modern Cartesian man, “master and owner of nature”. I refer here to the texts of trade-unionists like Pelloutier, Pouget or Griffuelhes (for France), to Bakunin and his ceaseless attacks against free will, to the wealth and originality of Proudhon’s analyses (“the individual is a group”, “any group is an individual”), to Elisée Reclus’s work and thought, to Kropotkin’s ethology, to the notion (sometimes so Nietzschean) of Malatesta’s “will”, and of course to the radical subjectivity of the Stirnerians and other Nietzscheans, those fierce scorners of modern individualism [5].
Historically, the originality of anarchism rested in its critique and denunciation of the pitfalls and lies of modernity, but also, of course, in its capacity to think and adopt social and political practices which broke off severely with such a modernity; it broke up the schemes and procedures of the social and economic order that appeared in the last three centuries; and all this stemmed from new forces, new practices and new subjectivities, with the uncompromising rejection of all representation, the adoption of direct action, federalism, association and autonomy of beings struggling for their emancipation [6]. By way of these astonishing theoretical assets, anarchism had therefore all the reasons to recognize and think out the spontaneous movements which, justifying it in return, have produced its reality and strength in the past (in Spain, in Ukraine, but also in a large number of other less known experiences). And thus anarchism had and has also every reason to recognize and express the coming emancipation movements, however new and surprising these might be, including, of course, to stick to the current events, the various practices called “anarcho-autonomous”, for instance.
But as we have seen and as Tomas Ibanez has pointed out, this is far from being the case. The originality, the force and novelty of anarchism have largely been covered up by its adversaries. Established anarchism has abandoned the breath of emancipation that appeared in the singularity and originality of its birth for the protective and oppressive shade of the order which it pretended to abolish. Such is a renunciation which is doubly detrimental to anarchism: 1) by submitting it to the ways of thought and world visions which serve as foundations to of modern domination; 2) by enclosing it more particularly in a most impoverished version of this mendacious and selfish thought, that of the school (of Jules Ferry in the French case), the school for the people and battalions of disciplined workers that were requested for the second industrial revolution, a school in which as Monatte very rightly said, the people “while learning how to read had unlearnt how to discern”.
Foucault

Again, I’m globally in agreement with what Tomas says. The big question that Foucault asks the anarchists might be formulated in this way: why does an author so close to libertarian thought, thanks to whom the question of power has finally become a central issue, why is such an author the target of a visceral rejection or at least a complete indifference for most of the anarchists? [7] To answer this question one should take into account a great number of reasons [8]. I will examine two of them.
Foucault’s pessimism
The first seems to me to belong to the source or the inspiration of Foucault’s thought. Contrarily to Deleuze, for instance, Foucault is characterized by a deep pessimism as to the possibility of getting out of power relations or more precisely of organizing them in an emancipative manner [9]. I refer to one of his sayings, in the aftermath of his book on the history of sexuality (La volonté de savoir [10]) as he was then getting into a long theoretical crisis: “always the same incapacity to cross the line, pass on the other side, listen and try to let be heard the language that comes from elsewhere or from down below; always the same choice, on the side of power, of what it says or sends word of” (“La vie des hommes infâmes”, Les Cahiers du Chemin, 1977, p. 16.) This deep and primal pessimism is also taken into account by Deleuze when he explains how, for Foucault: “if one must seek life as a power from outside, how do we know if that outside is not a terrifying emptiness and that this life which seems to resist is not a simple distribution in the emptiness of ‘partial, progressive and slow’ deaths?” (Foucault, p. 102).
And it is probably here (and in what is its best part) that anarchism is effectively tempted to part from Foucault, in the name of an assertion (that one would be wrong to qualify as naïve) according to which it is possible to draw away from the domination, lies and illusions of power, to see power relations combine in other ways and transform themselves into emancipating relations. But even on this issue, assuredly determinant for what it implies as will (in the Nietzschean or Malatesta’s sense of the word) does not anarchism, at its best part or quite simply as genuinely libertarian, does not anarchism also share this anguish about the beyond of revolution, of another world that would only be “a terrifying hollowness”, an unbearable fault and chaos, quickly and inevitably covered up by even the most unjust and oppressive social order [11]? Even better, as is shown by the red and black libertarian flags, is not this anguish of the beyond a necessary condition of a true desire for a radical transformation? It would at least circumvent the soap opera proclamations, the hollow and empty words built in such a high sounding way on the model they denounce, which are so sectarian, radical and detached from what they mechanically communicate that we must conclude that those who proclaim them never had the slightest desire or will to change anything whatever, as too many historical examples lead one to notice.
The closeness of anarchism and Foucault
The second reason for the anarchists’ refusal or indifference to Foucault’s analyses stems from a paradox: the great proximity between both and more particularly, as Tomas Ibanez points out, the importance Foucault grants to the reality of power, its ubiquitous, brutal and insidious character, crossing through the most harmless interactions, organizing in series (in the sense that Proudhon gives to this word) and producing structures of domination (Churches, States, Political parties and the very Individuals) with a capacity of illusion and oppression that does not rely firstly on their blinding visibility but on the tight and often imperceptible network of immediate and tiny dominations of which these structures are but the resultant (Proudhon again). Without a doubt, with Proudhon (and now Bakunin), anarchists are supposed to know in what manner these resultants, in the same manner as God or the State, meet our eyes deceitfully as the illusory cause of what produces and feeds them [12]. But this illusion, which constitutes a modernity grounded on the belief of in rational actors, originators and masters of their actions, is precisely a widely shared illusion (thence therefore its real efficacy), both by those who assert its evidence and necessity (the greatest number and the most cynical [13]) but also, alas, by far too many anarchists who, in an opposite and symmetrical way, satisfy themselves in by adopting the world views they fight against, and never wondering why they always end up by obtaining the opposite of what they intend, overdoing it on the contrary, in the way of the partisans of the so-called Arshinov platform for example [14]. As evidenced by the secularist ethic –this duplicate of the religious moral code – one may be for or against the State, for or against Capital, for or against divine transcendence, and function in exactly the same way, sharing the same conceptions and representations, believing that State, Capital and divine transcendence are really the authors and the (ultimate) causes of our happiness or our misery.
It seems to me that Foucault, Deleuze and some others constitute a sort of litmus test for contemporary libertarian thought. The reactions they stir up show how creeds and patterns of action stemming from the order they denounce cover every first and spontaneous libertarian movements’ inspiration, will and thoughts, while Foucault and Deleuze, like the child of Anderson’s tale, reveal the nakedness of a contradictory anarchist tradition. In other words, and this time in the manner of Poe’s and Lacan’s “Purloined letter”, the denial of the proximity between Foucault and anarchism is all the more significant to the degree that this proximity is more clearly evident. As it happens, there is a triple proximity.
1 – Firstly, an immediate proximity common to everyone. In effect, one needs neither to have long experience nor to have read Foucault, of course, to find out that power is everywhere, from the world order to the slightest detail of life, under multiple forms and relations, including (and one could say particularly) in the collectives or organizations of an anarchist character, precisely where one is the most prone to believe that power is inevitably elsewhere, outside, on the part of others. Like shoemakers and doctors who lack medical care, anarchists think they are justified in walking barefooted in the cold of winter and that they elude the diseases connected with power since their raison d’être consists unquestionably in denouncing and challenging such power. In the anarchist environment (as everywhere else), and particularly within permanent or long-lasting organizations, everything is power, struggle and confrontation, but is all the more hypocritical and wild or destructive (even though it is on a small scale) to the degree that one denies the existence of such power relations. Foucault is evidently correct. Everybody knows that, and even the most dogmatic anarchist will never fail to recognize it, face to face, in an intimate way, when the conversation is sincere, when the shield of the activist and ideological superego is laid down, when one is no longer on duty (and relaxed, for a change). In this way, and it is dispiriting to notice it, the anarchists’ superego and denial, so deprived of a libertarian inspiration, so contrary to the anarchist idea, is not different, on a small scale, from the religious and political denials and superegos, from the Inquisition to the Soviet Secret Police and all the other paradises of lies, repression and hypocrisy. With two differences, however:
one very negative, pitiful and somewhat ridiculous is the fact that the anarchism which denies that these power relations are operating in the slightest of our actions and looks, is precisely expected, by its very nature, to be the most apt to perceive them and drive them out from cover.
The other, paradoxically more positive, relates to the fact that the vast majority of libertarians share a (logical and welcome) incapacity to succeed in what the defenders of order and power achieve; they are incapable of following the rules of action they claim to enact; in spite of themselves, they cannot but mirror/mimic anarchism (even under its negative aspect), a movement that they have so many reasons to take inspiration from and which (luckily) they would have the greatest difficulty dismissing.
2 – There is a second reason besides this proximity between anarchism and Foucault’s analyses. It relates to what is historically known (on the topic of power) about libertarian movements and experiments, and first of all, as a case in point, to how in practical and political matters they refer to the pair authoritarian/antiauthoritarian. These notions have been both very precise and very broad in their usage, from the time when the practices and mode of organization of the Marxist international were denounced until the current and polyvalent use of the word in a great number of areas, situations and relations (education, work, family, war, etc. [15]). What Foucault brings to light through his analyses, the omnipresence of power relations, the libertarian movements perceive immediately in their moments of effectiveness and consistency. It is even basically from this very sharp and hard-line perception that they form their distinctive movements [16]. And this occurs in two ways:
– Through a spontaneous and exacerbated sensitivity to immediate and apparently minuscule and mild forms of authority and power, which their allies and rivals (mainly the Marxists) consider as peripheral (considering the tasks to be performed, the historical mission one is the servant of, etc.) [17]
– Through an equally epidermal touchiness which it would be mistaken to stamp out too quickly and thoughtlessly as a supposedly emotionally disturbed anarchist temperament. It rather ought to be compared with the pride and susceptibility of the warrior discussed by Deleuze and Guattari in Mille Plateaux, a hypersensitivity both feminine and masculine in which, without choosing the easy way out, one might recognize the well-chosen encounter between the libertarian idea and a trait usually attributed to the Spaniards, but also to contemporary anarcha-feminists, with their references to Judith Butler’s analyses, for instance, where even the order of sexes and genders gets confused and may thus reconstruct itself in some other way, one might say anarchically [18].
Hypersensitivity to all relations of authority, touchiness and extreme pride are not, however, the sole characteristics of the anti-authoritarian dimension of anarchism. Without really modifying their nature or immediacy, they broaden to cover all the libertarian movements’ practices and modes of action and association.
This occurs in two opposite directions: on the one side it links up with a very specific individualism through which anarchist radical subjectivism asserts itself, but also, on the other, towards all the social and revolutionary ways of living and unfolding, which (generally) have the capacity to maintain the tension between absolute autonomy and association, immediate interactions and broad power relations. I would not like to lengthen this text beyond measure and detail an analysis which I have attempted to develop elsewhere. I will only call to mind two patterns of those libertarian experiments:
– A first characteristic is the originality and radical horizontality of these forms of association and grouping. They ceaselessly watch out for what is mentioned by the 19th century revolutionary songs, the conditions for that mysterious “independence from the world” or that “universal independence”, which they endeavor to ensure to all their elements (from the larger ones to the narrower, overlapping one another) [19]. Anarchist thought has tried to think about a “free association of free forces” (Bakunin) through the concept of federalism: federalism of communes, federalism of groups, squatters and all other possible collectives, whether long lasting or fugitive, federalism of unions, about which Pouget writes that “federations and association of trade-unions are autonomous in the Confederation; trade-unions are autonomous in the federations and associations of unions; members of trade-unions are autonomous in the unions.” (La Confédération Générale du Travail, 1910).
– Another distinction of libertarian experiments is even more determining: it is equilibrium, in the Proudhonian sense of the word, that is to say a permanent tension between a multiplicity of forces, positions and diverse courses of life, often contradictory but perceived, in their relation, as equally necessary for emancipation; and this may occur between collectives and those other groups that are individualities, between statutes, statements, formalized agreements, and the determining influence of informal or hidden networks, from the Spanish militancia or the secret societies and other intimate Bakuninist circles to the functioning of the contemporary black-blocs and including all possible forms of affinity groups (trade, friendship, childhood, ideas) which have been the strong point and originality of the Spanish CNT at the time of its eminence. One might also add to these first examples a great number of other necessary tensions and equilibriums, between “revolutionary-syndicalists”, “men of action”, “reformists”, “pure unionists”, “revolutionaries”, “anti-organizational individualities”, “autonomous groups”, “advocates of organization”, “anarcho-syndicalists”, “councilists”, “ultra-leftists”, etc. to which one should also add the numerous embodiments of anarchism and self-defined anarchist circles from “insurrectionists” to “educationalist and achiever” (a typology dear to Gaetano Manfredonia), passing through pacifists, naturists, vegetarians, vegetalians [20], feminists, as well as attentats [21], pilfering, community life, esperantism (and its idoist variation [22]), antimilitarism, free communes, illegalism, alternative schools, anarcho-communism, hoboism, anti alcoholism and straight-edge, free thought and anticlericalism, libertarian communism, free love, cooperation, abortion and vasectomy, collectivism, reappropriation, primitivism, individualism, neo-malthusianism, etc. not to mention the even more fragmented and paradoxical character of a collective culture placed under the sign of eclecticism and self-education.
3 – I will be more concise on the third closeness between Foucault and libertarian thought, and it will serve as a conclusion, particularly on the differences I may have about with Tomas Ibanez’ text. This third proximity follows from all that has preceded and deals with the eminently theoretical and philosophical dimension of anarchism, the wealth and power of libertarian thought.
It is evident that I do not want to give the impression of underestimating Foucault’s originality and important contribution. It only seems to me that anarchism disposes of considerable theoretical resources, most often unemployed, which do not just echo Foucault’s analyses that I have tried to present, but which also enable one to catch and develop all their implications which, in return, will develop a greater capacity to express all their potentialities [23]. And it is here that our attitude vis-à-vis Foucault, Deleuze and others too easily qualified as postmodern, implies, within the heart of the libertarian project, a much broader way of thinking and acting: that it [is] to say a capacity for anarchism to co-opt, to ceaselessly repeat the totality of past, present and future human experiences in the double areas of emancipation and struggle against all forms of domination.
In my opinion, progress, that illusion of modernity, does not exist for anarchism [24]. Instead of a linear vision of history, everything is reenacted again, throughout an uninterrupted sequence of emancipating events of variable intensity. This is true for all of us, and as Simondon or Bakunin remind us (about Stankevitch for the latter), the most obscure life is again reenacted after one’s death. The past is never over. [25]. This discontinuous (but uninterrupted) sequence of emancipating experiences thus has the possibility (not always accomplished) of repeating and therefore giving a meaning to what has been acted elsewhere and previously (and which is never ended). It allows us to understand and recapture, in the light of the nineteenth century, Western anarchism and the beginning of the twentieth, the totality of past and exotic human experiences, which Elisée Reclus endeavored to describe without any exclusion, in an encyclopedic way, from the Greek democracy very dear to Eduardo Colombo, to John Clark’s Chinese Daoism, passing through Clastres’ Indian tribes or the Medieval “communes”, so special to Landauer this time, and many more things still. Nineteenth century European anarchism can unceasingly take on new meaning and express some of the infinite possibilities which it bears (for good as well as bad) in the light of Foucault, Deleuze, May 68 or the squatters and anarcho-autonomists or anarcha-feminist movements; and Foucault, Deleuze, May 68 or the squatters and anarcho-autonomist or anarcha-feminist movements can likewise find their full expression and express the emancipating potentialities which they bear in the light of this past anarchism which they enlighten and which also enlightens them. They are its re-enactment, “neither quite the same, nor quite someone other” as Baudelaire says about his relation to women.
I will end with the matter of my difference with Tomas Ibanez’ text. Tomas explains to us how, in his view, “post-anarchism” must “substitute itself for classical anarchism while taking over elements of the latter’s fundamental impetus ”. It seems to me that by this formula Tomas shows well where we differ. Speaking of “classical anarchism,” which he would distinguish from a mysterious “fundamental impetus”, he confuses the shadow with the prey, the shadow of a very narrow anarchism, backward-looking and identitarian, indeed submissive to the “undesirable influence of the Enlightenment”. That age, which was present since the beginning and homologous to the modern order and dominations, has very logically survived the defeats of the libertarian movements, up to the point of causing forgetfulness of the theoretical and practical power and wealth of a project and a worldview which one must rightly repeat and update, avoiding if possible following another trap, appearing in the shape of various “post-anarchisms” , of which Viven Garcia has shown the poverty [26].
Daniel COLSON
(Transl. Ronald Creagh, and edited by John P. Clark)