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Introduction by Jesse COHN
Comments by Irene Pereira
I want to discuss the comments made on this mailing list [1].

Is Anarchism a philosophical current?

Let us then highlight what is implicitly at stake in this decentering, namely a set of “methodological issues.” Can we really, as the postanarchists do, treat anarchism as a philosophy among other philosophies? Does this nebulous politics constitute a particular object of study for those who want to think with the tools of philosophy? What is the place of philosophy with regard to the practices and thoughts that comprise the actuality of anarchism?
The combination of philosophy and anarchism is not self-evident. Until a few years ago, the idea of making a philosophical reflection on anarchism would have been considered surprising if not aberrant. And this for the wrong reasons, but sometimes for good reasons as well. Regardless of the wrong reasons, they are all too often linked to the vulgar representations of anarchism as something shameful and contemptible. The good reasons can be divided into two categories, each of which implies the other. The first relates to the problems posed by submitting the events and traces of anarchism to the classic frameworks of philosophical reflection. One can discuss the important contradictions between the different currents of anarchism, the different authors, different texts by the same authors, a multitude of facts that prevent us from establishing a textual corpus that one could easily traverse, guided by a single set of concepts drawn from a supposed founding father. More importantly, one might also allude to forms of writing specific to anarchism, more often yielding texts of political intervention than the philosophical essay proper to a theoretical activity taking place outside of the empirical reality of effective politics. This anchoring in a praxis is indeed the source of the second reason which makes it difficult to link anarchism with philosophy: a certain anarchist rejection of philosophy. This is expressed many times by Malatesta, for whom philosophy is often, in political movements, “simply a play on words or an illusionist’s trick” [2], since political will is not the effect of a prior theory. Thus, anarchism, as a politics, “in its origins, its aspirations, and its methods of struggle, is not necessarily linked to any philosophical system” [3]
What we would like to point out through these words are the unavoidable pitfalls of an approach that seeks to think anarchism as being in itself a philosophy (or a set of philosophies). Such an approach can only lead to contradictions and even to the oblivion of the object it tries to think. Our willingness to discuss postanarchism thus gives birth in recoil to the philosophy itself. It takes root where postanarchist theses ring false, precisely because these philosophers of difference have ignored (or taken care to ignore) some dissonances between actual anarchisms and the theoretical modelof anarchism they have constructed. Does this imply that we can make use of philosophy as a separate, secondary discourse, which should recuse itself when it intrudes into the field of politics? Philosophy and politics constitute incommensurable domains. Should we then return to the situation, unfortunately prevailing for the majority of the twentieth century, in which historic discourse seemed to be the only legitimate form of the study of anarchism? That is not our intention, since we chose a philosophical expression. But that choice means abandoning the major polar categories involved in the reflexive frameworks of classical political philosophy: theory versus practice, unconditional concepts versus the variations of political discourses . . . Thus, there is no question, as the postanarchists would have it, of thinking anarchism through a grouping of texts in which we try to discover some truth. No doctrine can claim to represent the social and political actuality of anarchisms. However, this actuality nonetheless contains an idea. This is why we employ a few tools bequeathed to us by Proudhon, especially his analysis of the question of theory and practice. Every activity carries meaning; just as, in social activity, every idea is the expression of interests or conflicts, or rather, it is those interests and conflicts in their reality.

Theory and Action

Theory and action are the material for the same social experience. Nevertheless this merger is not complete. One can differentiate two possible uses of the theory: idéomania and idéofortia. The first term serves as a foil, it indicates a theory that is preliminary to practice, that rules over practice. The second term stands as its positive counterpoint: it refers to the idea as a living force. Thus Proudhon in De La Capacité politique des classes ouvrières, is interested in the idea of the working-class, the concept of the self-constitution of the working class, but especially in knowing the “laws, conditions and formulae of its existence” [4] . Philosophy’s task is to give this idea its specific formulation. In doing so, it engages in an effort that could be described as metapolitical. It is a matter of thinking with politics in acts, in terms of their philosophical effects. Of course, this does not prohibit making any reference to a theoretical anarchism. On the contrary. But we need to consider the writings that express anarchism in terms of what they are: texts of political intervention, not philosophical or even political treatises. It is from this perspective that philosophy and anarchism can be linked. Some philosophical tools can serve to express anarchism in a new way; anarchism can traverse philosophy.

Searching for principles or reflecting on the effects of political practices.

Our use of philosophy requires a redefinition of the possibilities and the roles that are assigned to it in the study politics, particularly with respect to anarchism. Thus, we set our face against the tradition of political philosophy, which muffles the din of political processes, always trying to determine what are the principles of THE political good, to dictate lessons ti actual politics in a spectatorial manner. What is important for us is toproduce a philosophy that derives its speculative dimension from political practices, as it is based on their effects. Such an approach, then, means abandoning philosophy for politics, producing philosophy not as a reflection on or a set of statements about politics but as a political intervention itself.

An ontology of anarchism?

Having made these clarifications, it becomes possible to advance some answers to the objections raised by Irène Pereira on the question of the ontology of anarchism. These objections are more than understandable given that, in our book, we refer to her debate with Daniel Colson led on this topic, and given that we adopt a position similar to his. Nevertheless, I. Pereira’s propositions concerning our choice have the merit of uncovering new elements of reflection. They are based on the etymology of the term “ontology” , recalling that it has to do with a set of discourses on Being, and citing Plato’ Theaeteus as a paradigm of the problems raised thereby. What is at stake here is that any attempt to know Being presupposes its fixity - hence the fierce opposition between Plato and the Sophists. While it is not important to discuss this point at greater length, we would like to stress that Irène Pereira reduces the ontological question to its most classical forms. Since the transcendence of the two positions set forth earlier barely seems possible to her, she will referr to the history of philosophy to show how ontology is an ancient concept from which most of the subsequent developments in the disciplinehave been fixed. Modern Thought impels a decentralisation that would allow it to found its discourse no longer on Being but on the subject. This is the example of Kant and his philosophical anthropology. Another momentis marked by structuralism, to the extent that it leads us to conceive of the subject no longer as constitutive, but as constituded (by the unconscious, by economic and political structures or even by myths, etc.). Poststructuralism puts the finishing touches on this story by pushing the rejection of the modern subject even further, dissolving the dichotomy between subject and structure. This perspective is tied to networks of contingent practices that aim to think change, the different, the event. For Irène Pereira, this approach still requires us to fill the void left by the absence of the notion of the subject. One way to do this, which she attributes to Deleuze (but also, by extension, to our work), is to return to an ontology, but this time anti-essentialist. However, according to Irène Pereira, this implies a logial leap to the idea of an anti-essentialist ontology. To speak of ontology while denying the fixity of essences, to say that Be is constantly changing, implies that we can predicate something constant about it. Otherwise, the snake bites its own tail, and as soon as one speaks of a refusal of transcendence and the Absolute, we reintroduced it in the form of a pseudo-knowledge of the totality.
In addition, Irène Pereira adds that the notion of ontology presupposes that one deduces a whole philosophy from it. This knowledge comes first, then one determines its consequences for different fields: anthropology, ethics, politics, epistemology, aesthetics ... Yet it is precisely this false common sense that our book is intended to depart from. We intentionally insisted, in an ironic manner, on making a presentation of anarchism after the manner of a Summa. In this sense,one might be given to believe that we present anarchism as a philosophical system (from which an aesthetics is lacking). However, it would be to ignore the methodology that guides our analysis of the political act, and this is precisely what we wish to recall here. For to posit that anarchism is an affirmation of becoming, of the many, is in no way to speak of an explicit discursive affirmation, of a proclamation. Such propositions, although they do exist, are nonetheless rare in the anarchist literature. Most of the time, anarchists hardly bother to argue about these questions belonging to the philosophical tradition.. We can only speak of ontology if we try to grasp the philosophical effects of anarchism. In this sense we must relativize the pretenses with which we amused ourselves by writing L’Anarchisme aujourdhui, without thinking that all anarchists share the same ontological discourse from which they deduce all their acts. In fact, the “ontological” commitment of anarchism is not merely exhibited in the section we devote to the subject, for it is often within the anarchist practicess themselves that the ontology of which we speak is revealed, to the extent that they can be cited as subversions by the deed of discourses on Being. Thus, anarchism is not theoretically deduced from ontology. Rather, it is our approach to the political act that impels us to flush out the ontological effects of anarchism. We have constructed an ontological discourse from the expressions of anarchism, often in the form of practice. In this sense, we are in agreement with I. Pereira, to some extent, in speaking of an “ontology” of anarchism only in terms of consequences.” However, we refuse to consider that “ontology” as dependent upon one philosophy of anarchism among a plurality of others. We reject this perspective inasmuch as to speak of an anarchist philosophy or philosophies has no sense for us. Anarchism has a multitude of declensions, but these are not philosophical doctrines to which we refer before acting, but politics in acts. They possess their own logic, beyond philosophy and its history, without for that reason ceasing to be thought. To that extent, our philosophical expression encounters no problem in speaking of an “ontology” of anarchism.
But let us dwell a bit longer on the idea that an anti-essentialist ontology would necessarily be illogical. This idea is based on two assumptions. The first is that any ontological discourse would have gnosiological pretensions – which would be, to say the least, a restrictive definition in light of contemporary philosophy. The second is that in order to judge concerning ontological questions, some rather Aristotelian logical framework will suffice, a framework that Irène Pereira seems to apply more or less consciously. There is no doubt that, considered from such an imprisoning perspective, a thought like that of Deleuze (whom I.P. specifically targets) cannot be logical. And that is quite common, since the thought of Deleuze is based, among other things, on a critique of classical logic. Let us listen, however. If Deleuze attests to a violent rejection of logic, one must clearly understand that he refers to logic as an institutionalized discipline. The latter, according to him, only serves to justify xommon sense, and is “reductionist not accidentally but essentially and necessarily” [5]. This critique does not imply the refusal of all logic, but thinking in the context of “a new logic, definitely a logic, but one that grasps the innermost depths of life and death without leading us back to reason” [5] [6]. Therefore, the idea of an anti-essentialist ontology rightly draws all its logic from the paradox: it reveals itself through a subversion of the notion of ontology. It is for this reason that we can not agree with I. Pereira’s presentation of the history of philosophy. Not only did issues of ontology fail to resurface in philosophy before Deleuze, but in addition, his philosophy is not to be understood as a return to ontology. Instead, it constitutes a subversion of its classical interpretation, even, in some ways, of its Heideggerian treatment. It calls into question the relevance of the term “being” – going so far as to think, at some point, to substitute “having” (a substitution that does not fail to recall Stirner’s example). If we want to understand the meaning of this subversion, it is necessary to focus on Deleuze’s resumption of the theme of the univocity of being. Philosophy, Deleuze tells us, “merges with ontology, but ontology merges with the univocity of Being” [7].
Yet the univocity of being does not mean that we can speak of Being, that we can say that there is only one Being. Univocity is rather an immediate synthesis of the multiple. But, here once again, let us be careful! Deleuze is not speaking of a dialectical synthesis, that would operate under the sign of totality, performing the work of reconciliation,absorbing the multiple within Being. He refers to a disjunctive synthesis that is not enclosed by its terms, but, on the contrary, is unlimited. The univocal movement of being is a continual intertwining of movements that strike out in contradictory directions, but in which each being directly implicates all beings. All have in common a single plane of immanence on which is woven a non-hierarchical communication among differents. The disjunctive synthesis therefore does not identify two contraries with the same, it affirms the distance between them as that which relates the one to the other as differents. Now we can apprehend this important idea, which anarchism continually tries to demonstrate in action: “the smallest becomes equivalent to the largest once it is not separated from what it can do” [8].

Anarchism and Nietzsche

Another part of Irène Pereira’s review deals with allusions to Nietzschean thought that one finds in this book. It is recalled, and we cannot contest it, as Nietzsche did not hesitate to fire red bullets on “the anarchists.” The “philosopher” even compared them, in some respects, with Christians! Let us cite his words:

“In other cases, the underprivileged man seeks the reason not in his “guilt” (as the Christian does), but in society: the socialist, the anarchist, the nihilist – in as much as they find their existence something of which someone must be guilty, they are still the closest relations of the Christian, who also believes he can better endure his sense of sickness and ill-constitutedness by finding someone whom he can make responsible for it. The instinct of revenge and ressentiment appears here in both cases as a means of enduring, as the instinct of self-preservation: just as is the preference for altruistic theory and practice.” [8] [9]

Symptoms of a diminished life, the weakness behind the anarchist’s vengefulness can be sensed in the devaluation of the power of the strong, who come to be seen as bad, in relation to the weak, who then become the good. But should we conclude from this that there is an irremediable rupture between Nietzsche and anarchism? We do not believe so. Two reasons (among others) will suffice to demonstrate why. The first relates to the representation of anarchism that Nietzsche appears to have. Despite an element of mystery, Nietzsche makes no secret of his merely passing knowledge (likely filtered through a number of mediations of varying reliability) of the political movement with which we are concerned. We will add to this that Nietzsche was focusing all of his criticism of “anarchism” (beyond that which we have just cited) on one figure, a conceptual character that he calls “the anarchist”, rather than on any anarchist movement still in its infancy. The second, more relevant reason is based on a simple historical fact: the anarchists did not hesitate to take an interest in Nietzsche and even to shamelessly plunder the propositions of the “philosopher.” Let us note, moreover, that in our book, references to Nietzsche’s philosophy are present only via the writings and practices of anarchists who align themselves with certain elements of Nietzscheanism. But these findings, however illuminating, should not lead to hasty conclusions that would make Nietzsche an anarchist or anarchism into Nietzscheanism. They only leave open a way to identify some discrete affinities that go beyond the acts and declarations that have issued from Nietzsche and various anarchists. One of the most relevant in this context is the work of Daniel Colson, in part, through his article “Nietzsche et l’anarchisme” [“Nietzsche and the Libertarian Workers’ Movement” ].
However, while not contesting the historical discovery of a “proximity of Nietzsche’s thought to some elements of revolutionary syndicalism,” Irène Pereira questioned the interest of the development of a Nietzschean dimension of anarchism. One must be careful, she says, about the “contempt for passive majorities,” the “confusion between democracy and the critique of ‘democratism,’” or even “a certain fascination with violence,” which seem to have allowed – in the case of Sorel, for example – the recuperation of revolutionary syndicalism by fascism. To this critique, we will answer that the elements of Nietzsche’s philosophy underlined by Irène Pereira seem too much derived from clichés concerning the author. Without embarking on a philosophical exegesis, we must indicate all the same that we can not consider the possible links between anarchism and the thought of Nietzsche via philosophical commonplaces. These commonplaces, let us note in passing, have indeed been at the root of the recuperation of Nietzsche by various fascisms (but also, by extension, of a variety of other thoughts and practices that claimed him as their inspiration). In this sense, if we have previously cited as an example the work of Daniel Colson, it is because he goes beyond the clichés traditionally rehearsed in connection with Nietzsche’s thought in order to think its possible links with anarchism. Of course, we do not mean that some elements of Nietzscheanism may appear ridiculous from an anarchist perspective, particularly in matters of politics as such. But why should this matter? What is our relation to Nietzsche’s thought with a view to its affinities with anarchism? In making a theoretical study of Nietzsche, are we concerned with attaining definitive knowledge of an object, or do we merely want to make political use of his work? If the latter is the case, what does it matter if we valorize some elements of Nietzscheanism and ignore others? The question of the correspondence between the possible use that anarchism can make of Nietzsche and THE thought of Nietzsche in the totality of its implications is of little interest!

A typology of libertarian practices?

Irène Pereira concludes her commentary with a sort of (tentative) typology of anarchist politics. On the one hand, she traces a path seen as issuing from the autonomous movement. It is characterized by a combination of the practices of “lifestyle” anarchism and insurrectionary practices of rioting. Here we find a postmodern expression of anarchism. On the other hand, there would be a path issuing from revolutionary syndicalism. This would combine gradualist practices and mass insurrection. This position, without being postmodern, attempts to go beyond modernity, notably in integrating “problematics arising from the emergence of autonomous feminist movements or movements of ethnic minorities as well as from the ecology movement” [10]. This description still leaves us doubtful. The multiplicity of libertarian practices does not seem to comply with such a static typology. Certainly, the idea that anarchism is currently divided between on the one hand the “autonomous” [11] and the other “traditional-but-not-too-traditional” may seem appealing. Even if it excludes a lot of people, it has a certain coherence to the extent that it seems rooted, more or less consciously, in the minds of many libertarians. It only gives us the impression of reviving the too traditional, but also too false [12] opposition between individualist and social (or mass) anarchism. So when Irène Pereira welcomes the link that we do between the milieux libres and the T.A.Z., it is in order to better denounce these practices for which, she says, “it is no longer a matter of seeking to produce an overall transformation of society, but rather to implement a temporary space of freedom” [13]. We have come full circle, for from such a description of these practices of “what we may call lifestyle anarchism, born from minoritarian practices of insurrection, rather than a form of social anarchism,” we find ourselves again confronting the Nietzscheanism denounced earlier. We are faced only with“elitist forms of practice in which a minority constitutes itself as an artificial micro-society at the margins of society.” However, if it is true that some libertarian experiments have faced and continue to face such problems, we should not proceed too quickly to generalizations. In L’Anarchisme aujourd’hui, we insisted that most of the milieux libres, but also a multitude of other types of anarchist political experimentation, do not (and did not) consider themselves as ends in themselves, without any view toward revolution. Let us listen to Andre Mounier on the colony of Aiglemont:

“One must not believe that the establishment of a milieu libre means that its participants intend to escape from Society in order to quietly eat cabbage soup in the woods. Nor does it constitute an infalliable means of bringing about the revolution. It simply allows people to intensify the propaganda of which they are capable, to do so with a freedom of behavior, in so far as they have no interest in the present Society, and each time an injustice is committed, each time a revolt beckons, thanks to the free commune [milieu libre], they need not worry about what they are leaving behind.” [14]

Let us listen to Hakim Bey, who defines the P.A.Z., the little sister of the T.A.Z., as “ a training-camp for the Uprising” [15]. And we could give a voice to many others; to make this clear, it suffices to take a look at the encyclopedic historical work conducted by Michel Antony on this subject. In addition, we can not understand the forms of syndicalism in which the anarchist idea is found in the manner of a mere radical and libertarian declension of the classical revolutionary left. The general strike, for example, loses its anarchist dimension if we subtract from it the widespread subversion of which it is the result: the multiplication and repetition of partial strikes, direct actions, and new associations of all sorts. But on this point, it seems that we agree with Irène Pereira, who asserts that “this pluralistic dimension of revolutionary syndicalism constitutes the richness of this movement, which also goes beyond the dualism between [...] lifestyle anarchism and social anarchism” [16].
Anarchist practices, being neither reactions to “some general principle(s), supposedly primary” nor attempts to escape from society, can be characterized by their own perpetual will to overcome all forms of domination, starting from the heart of things, from the very birthplace of dominations: from the interior of all the relations constitutive of that which exists. However, this in no way concludes in favor of some absurd unity of anarchist practices. Anarchism only exists through the plurality of its currents, its perspectives. But despite the divergences in logics, tactics, ideas, one can find the same understanding of the political.
Vivien Garcìa